he understands their significance or meaning. And all understanding, all meaning, is again individual experience.

It is all too common among men of science to assume that we somehow acquire scientific * concepts', and that such * concepts' are entities which somehow are shared by, or shareable by, all men; or, alternatively, that each of a thousand men may possess a concept which, so long as it is expressed by the utterance of the same word—say * colour'—is virtually identical with the similarly expressed concepts of the other 999 men.

In virtue of this fiction, this most misleading doctrine of concepts, it is held that concepts are in some sense public and objective, and not liable to the errors of personal peculiarities.

But, in truth, our so-called concepts are not less, but rather more, liable than our simplest sense-perceptions to share in the idiosyncrasies of our personalities. It is true that by severe discipline we may go some way (though never the whole way) towards attaining community of meaning among a small and highly select group of persons. But that is achieved in satisfactory degree only rarely; and even then conceptual thinking (as also any conclusion reached by its aid) remains always the activity of an individual, an individual experience which he can communicate to others only imperfectly, through some system of symbols (words, figures, diagrams, and whatnot) used according to conventional rules, in order to evoke (as best he may, but always inadequately) in other minds meanings similar to those

which are the essence of his own conscious activities.

Further, we never know just how far we succeed in this endeavour to evoke or, as we say, convey 'meanings' : we have no other test or evidence of this than the pragmatic one: How far do my communications succeed in